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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The US is now in its forth year of a mortgage crisis in which over 3 million families have 
lost their homes and another 2.5 million are currently scheduled to lose theirs. Repeated 
government loan modification or refinancing initiatives have failed miserably.  To this sad state 
of affairs, there now come a variety of additional problems:  faulty foreclosures due to 
irregularities ranging from procedural defects (including, but not limited to robosigning) to 
outright counterfeiting of documents; predatory servicing practices that precipitate borrower 
defaults and then overcharge for foreclosure services that are ultimately paid for by investors; 
and  questions about the validity of transfers in private-label mortgage securitizations.  While the 
extent of these problems is unknown at present, the evidence is mounting that they are not 
limited to one-off cases, but that there may be pervasive defects throughout the mortgage 
servicing and securitization processes.   
 
The servicing problems stem from servicers’ failed business model.  Servicers are 
primarily in the transaction processing business and are failing miserably at trying to adapt 
themselves to the loan modification business.  Servicers’ business model also encourages them to 
cut costs wherever possible, even if this involves cutting corners on legal requirements, and to 
lard on junk fees and in-sourced expenses at inflated prices.  The financial incentives of 
mortgage servicers also encourage them to foreclose, rather than modify loans in many cases, 
even when modification would maximize the net present value of the loan for investors.  
 
The chain of title problems are highly technical, but they pose a potential systemic risk to 
the US economy.  If mortgages were not properly transferred in the securitization process, then 
mortgage-backed securities would in fact not be backed by any mortgages whatsoever.  The 
chain of title concerns stem from transactions that make assumptions about the resolution of 
unsettled law.  If those legal issues are resolved differently, then there would be a failure of the 
transfer of mortgages into securitization trusts, which would cloud title to nearly every property 
in the United States and would create contract rescission/putback liabilities in the trillions of 
dollars, greatly exceeding the capital of the US’s major financial institutions.   
 
These problems are very serious.  At best they present problems of fraud on the court, 
clouded title to properties coming out of foreclosure, and delay in foreclosures that will increase 
the shadow housing inventory and drive down home prices.  At worst, they represent a systemic 
risk that would bring the US financial system back to the dark days of the fall of 2008.     
 
Congress would do well to ensure that federal regulators are undertaking a thorough 
investigation of foreclosure problems and to consider the possibilities for a global settlement of 
foreclosure problems, loan modifications, and the housing debt overhang on consumers and 
financial institutions that stagnate the economy and pose potential systemic risk.   
 
Madam Chairwoman, Members of the Committee: 
 
 Good morning.  My name is Adam Levitin.  I am an Associate Professor of Law at the 
Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., where I teach courses in bankruptcy, 
commercial law, contracts, and structured finance.  I also serve as Special Counsel to the 
Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.  The views I express 
today are my own, however.  
 We are now well into the fourth year of the foreclosure crisis, and there is no end in sight.  
Since mid-2007 around eight million homes entered foreclosure,1 and over three million 
borrowers lost their homes in foreclosure.2  As of June 30, 2010, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association reported that 4.57% of 1-4 family residential mortgage loans (roughly 2.5 million 
loans) were currently in the foreclosure, process a rate more than quadruple historical averages.  
(See Figure 1.)  Additionally, 9.85% of mortgages (roughly 5 million loans) were at least a 
month delinquent.3   
Chart 1:  Percentage of 1-4 Family Residential Mortgages in Foreclosure4 
 
 Private lenders, industry associations, and two successive administrations have made a 
variety of efforts to mitigate the crisis and encourage loan modifications and refinancings.  A 
series of much hyped initiatives, such as the FHASecure refinancing program and the 
Hope4Homeowners have all met what can charitably be described as limited success.  
FHASecure, predicted to help 240,000 homeowners,5 assisted only a few thousand borrowers 
                                                
1 HOPE Now Data Reports.  
2 Id.   
3 Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey.  
4 Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Surveys. 
5 See, e.g., Press Release, US Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, Bush Administration to Help Nearly One-Quarter of a 
Million Homeowners Refinance, Keep Their Homes; FHA to implement new “FHASecure” refinancing product (Aug. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr07-123.cfm; Press Release, US Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Helps 400,000 
Families Find Mortgage Relief; Refinancing on pace to help half-million homeowners by year’s end (Oct. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr08- 167.cfm. 
2 
before it wound down,6 while Hope4 Homeowners, originally predicted to help 400,000 
homeowners,7 had closed only 130 refinancings as of September 30, 2010.8  The Home 
Affordable Modification (HAMP) has also failed, producing 495,898 permanent modifications 
through September 2010.  This number is likely to be a high water mark for HAMP, as new 
permanent modifications are decreasing rapidly while defaults on permanent modifications rise; 
if current trends continue, by year’s end the number of active permanent HAMP modifications 
will actually decline.  
A number of events over the past several months have roiled the mortgage world, raising 
questions about: 
(1)  Whether there is widespread fraud in the foreclosure process;  
(2) Securitization chain of title, namely whether the transfer of mortgages in the 
securitization process was defective, rendering mortgage-backed securities into non-mortgage-
backed securities;  
(3) Whether the use of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) creates 
legal defects in either the secured status of a mortgage loan or in mortgage assignments; 
(4) Whether mortgage servicers’ have defaulted on their servicing contracts by charging 
predatory fees to borrowers that are ultimately paid by investors; 
(5) Whether investors will be able to “putback” to banks securitized mortgages on the 
basis of breaches of representations and warranties about the quality of the mortgages. 
These issues are seemingly disparate and unconnected, other than that they all involve 
mortgages.  They are, however, connected by two common threads:  the necessity of proving 
standing in order to maintain a foreclosure action and the severe conflicts of interests between 
mortgage servicers and MBS investors.   
It is axiomatic that in order to bring a suit, like a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must 
have legal standing, meaning it must have a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation.  In the 
case of a mortgage foreclosure, only the mortgagee has such an interest and thus standing.  Many 
of the issues relating to foreclosure fraud by mortgage servicers, ranging from more minor 
procedural defects up to outright counterfeiting relate to the need to show standing.  Thus 
problems like false affidavits of indebtedness, false lost note affidavits, and false lost summons 
affidavits, as well as backdated mortgage assignments, and wholly counterfeited notes, 
mortgages, and assignments all relate to the evidentiary need to show that the entity bringing the 
foreclosure action has standing to foreclose.   
Concerns about securitization chain of title also go to the standing question; if the 
mortgages were not properly transferred in the securitization process (including through the use 
of MERS to record the mortgages), then the party bringing the foreclosure does not in fact own 
the mortgage and therefore lacks standing to foreclose.  If the mortgage was not properly 
transferred, there are profound implications too for investors, as the mortgage-backed securities 
they believed they had purchased would, in fact be non-mortgage-backed securities, which 
                                                
6 Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J.,, Dec. 31, 2008.  
7 Dina ElBoghdady, HUD Chief Calls Aid on Mortgages a Failure, WASH. POST. Dec. 17, 2008, at A1. 
8 See FHA Single Family Outlook, Sept. 2010, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/ooe/olcurr.xls - 2010-11-02, Row 263 
(note that FHA fiscal years begin in October, so that Fiscal Year 2009 began in October 2008). 
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would almost assuredly lead investors to demand that their investment contracts be rescinded, 
thereby exacerbating the scale of mortgage putback claims.   
Putback claims underscore the myriad conflicts of interest between mortgage servicers 
and investors.  Mortgage servicers are responsible for prosecuting on behalf of MBS investors, 
violations of representations and warranties in securitization deals.  Mortgage servicers are 
loathe to bring such actions, however, not least because they would often be bringing them 
against their own affiliates.  Servicers’ failure to honor their contractual duty to protect investors’ 
interest is but one of numerous problems with servicer conflicts of interest, including the levying 
of junk fees in foreclosures that are ultimately paid by investors and servicing first lien loans 
while directly owning junior liens.   
Many of the problems in the mortgage securitization market (and thus this testimony) are 
highly technical, but they are extremely serious.9  At best they present problems of fraud on the 
court and questionable title to property.  At worst, they represent a systemic risk of liabilities in 
the trillions of dollars, greatly exceeding the capital of the US’s major financial institutions.  
While understanding the securitization market’s problems involves following a good deal of 
technical issues, it is critical to understand from the get-go that securitization is all about 
technicalities.   
Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance, and if securitization is to 
work it must adhere to its proper, prescribed form punctiliously.  The rules of the game with 
securitization, as with real property law and secured credit are, and always have been, that 
dotting “i’s” and crossing “t’s” matter, in part to ensure the fairness of the system and avoid 
confusions about conflicting claims to property.  Close enough doesn’t do it in securitization; if 
you don’t do it right, you cannot ensure that securitized assets are bankruptcy remote and thus 
you cannot get the ratings and opinion letters necessary for securitization to work.  Thus, it is 
important not to dismiss securitization problems as merely “technical;” these issues are no more 
technicalities than the borrower’s signature on a mortgage.  Cutting corners may improve 
securitization’s economic efficiency, but it undermines its legal viability.     
Finally, as an initial matter, let me also emphasize that the problems in the securitization 
world do not affect the whether homeowners owe valid debts or have defaulted on those debts. 
Those are separate issues about which there is no general controversy, even if debts are disputed 
in individual cases.10   
This written testimony proceeds as follows:  Part I presents an overview of the structure 
of the mortgage market, the role of mortgage servicers, the mortgage contract and foreclosure 
process.  Part II presents the procedural problems and fraud issues that have emerged in the 
mortgage market relating to foreclosures.  Part III addresses chain of title issues.  Part IV 
considers the argument that the problems in foreclosures are mere technicalities being used by 
deadbeats to delay foreclosure.  Part V concludes.   
 
                                                
9 I emphasize, however, that this testimony does not purport to be a complete and exhaustive treatment of the issues involved and that 
many of the legal issues discussed are not settled law, which is itself part of the problem; trillions of dollars of mortgage securitization 
transactions have been done without a certain legal basis.   
10 A notable exception, however, is for cases where the default is caused by a servicer improperly force-placing insurance or 
misapplying a payment, resulting in an inflated loan balance that triggers a homeowner default.  
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I.  BACKGROUND ON SECURITIZATION, SERVICING, AND THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS  
A. MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION 
Most residential mortgages in the United States are financed through securitization. 
Securitization is a financing method involving the issuance of securities against a dedicated 
cashflow stream, such as mortgage payments, that are isolated from other creditors’ claims.  
Securitization links consumer borrowers with capital market financing, potentially lowering the 
cost of mortgage capital.  It also allows financing institutions to avoid the credit risk, interest rate 
risk, and liquidity risk associated with holding the mortgages on their own books.   
Currently, about 60% of all outstanding residential mortgages by dollar amount are 
securitized.11  The share of securitized mortgages by number of mortgages outstanding is much 
higher because the securitization rate is lower for larger “jumbo” mortgages.12  Credit Suisse 
estimates that 75% of outstanding first-lien residential mortgages are securitized.13  In recent 
years, over 90% of mortgages originated have been securitized.14 Most second-lien loans, 
however, are not securitized.15 
Although mortgage securitization transactions are extremely complex and vary somewhat 
depending on the type of entity undertaking the securitization, the core of the transaction is 
relatively simple.16 
First, a financial institution (the “sponsor” or “seller”) assembles a pool of mortgage 
loans.  The loans were either made (“originated”) by an affiliate of the financial institution or 
purchased from unaffiliated third-party originators.  Second, the pool of loans is sold by the 
sponsor to a special-purpose subsidiary (the “depositor”) that has no other assets or liabilities.  
This is done to segregate the loans from the sponsor’s assets and liabilities.17  Third, the 
depositor sells the loans to a passive, specially created, single-purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a 
trust in the case of residential mortgages.18  The SPV issues certificated securities to raise the 
funds to pay the depositor for the loans.  Most of the securities are debt securities—bonds—but 
there will also be a security representing the rights to the residual value of the trust or the 
“equity.” 
                                                
11 Inside Mortgage Finance, 2010 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual. 
12 Id. 
13 Ivy L. Zelman et al., Mortgage Liquidity du Jour: Underestimated No More 28 exhibit 21 (Credit Suisse, Equity Research Report, 
Mar. 12, 2007). 
14 Inside Mortgage Finance, 2010 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual. 15  Inside Mortgage Finance, 2010 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual.  From 2001-2007, only 14% of second lien mortgages 
originated were securitized.  Id.  Second lien mortgages create a conflict of interest beyond the scope of this paper.  In many cases, second lien 
loans are owned by financial institutions that are servicing (but do not own) the first lien loan.  See Hearing Before the House Financial Services 
Committee, Apr. 13, 2009 “Second Liens and Other Barriers to Principal Reduction as an Effective Foreclosure Mitigation Program” (testimony 
of Barbara DeSoer, President, Bank of America Home Loans) at 6 (noting that Bank of America owns the second lien mortgage on 15% of the 
first lien mortgages it services); Hearing Before the House Financial Services Committee, Apr. 13, 2009 “Second Liens and Other Barriers to 
Principal Reduction as an Effective Foreclosure Mitigation Program” (testimony of David Lowman, CEO for Home Lending, JPMorgan Chase) 
at 5 (noting that Chase owns the second lien mortgage on around 10% of the first lien mortgages it services).  The ownership of the second while 
servicing the first creates a direct financial conflict between the servicer qua servicer and the servicer qua owner of the second lien mortgage, as 
the servicer has an incentive to modify the first lien mortgage in order to free up borrower cashflow for payments on the second lien mortgage.   
16 The structure illustrated is for private-label mortgage-backed securities.  Ginnie Mae and GSE securitizations are structured 
somewhat differently.  The private-label structure can, of course, be used to securitize any asset, from oil tankers to credit card debt to song 
catalogues, not just mortgages. 
17 This intermediate entity is not essential to securitization, but since 2002, Statement of Financial Accountings Standards 140 has 
required this additional step for off-balance-sheet treatment because of the remote possibility that if the originator went bankrupt or into 
receivership, the securitization would be treated as a secured loan, rather than a sale, and the originator would exercise its equitable right of 
redemption and reclaim the securitized assets.  Deloitte & Touche, Learning the Norwalk Two-Step, HEADS UP , Apr. 25, 2001, at 1. 
18 The trustee will then typically convey the mortgage notes and security instruments to a “master document custodian,” who 
manages the loan documentation, while the servicer handles the collection of the loans.   
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The securities can be sold directly to investors by the SPV or, as is more common, they 
are issued directly to the depositor as payment for the loans.  The depositor then resells the 
securities, usually through an underwriting affiliate that then places them on the market.  (See 
Figure 2, below.)  The depositor uses the proceeds of the securities sale (to the underwriter or the 
market) to pay the sponsor for the loans.  Because the certificated securities are collateralized by 
the residential mortgage loans owned by the trust, they are called residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS). 
A variety of reasons—credit risk (bankruptcy remoteness), off-balance sheet accounting 
treatment, and pass-through tax status (typically as a REMIC19 or grantor trust)—mandate that 
the SPV be passive; it is little more than a shell to hold the loans and put them beyond the reach 
of the creditors of the financial institution.20  Loans, however, need to be managed.  Bills must be 
sent out and payments collected.  Thus, a third-party must be brought in to manage the loans.21  
This third party is the servicer.  The servicer is supposed to manage the loans for the benefit of 
the RMBS holders.  
Every loan, irrespective of whether it is securitized, has a servicer.  Sometimes that 
servicer is a first-party servicer, such as when a portfolio lender services its own loans.  Other 
times it is a third-party servicer that services loans it does not own.  All securitizations involve 
third-party servicers, but many portfolio loans also have third-party servicers, particularly if they 
go into default.  Third-party servicing contracts for portfolio loans are not publicly available, 
making it hard to say much about them, including the precise nature of servicing compensation 
arrangements in these cases or the degree of oversight portfolio lenders exercise over their third-
party servicers.  Thus, it cannot always be assumed that if a loan is not securitized it is being 
serviced by the financial institution that owns the loan, but if the loan is securitized, it has third-
party servicing. 
Securitization divides the beneficial ownership of the mortgage loan from legal title to 
the loan and from the management of the loans.  The SPV (or more precisely its trustee) holds 
legal title to the loans, and the trust is the nominal beneficial owner of the loans.  The RMBS 
investors are formally creditors of the trust, not owners of the loans held by the trust. 
The economic reality, however, is that the investors are the true beneficial owners.  The 
trust is just a pass-through holding entity, rather than an operating company.  Moreover, while 
the trustee has nominal title to the loans for the trust, it is the third-party servicer that typically 
exercises legal title in the name of the trustee. The economic realities of securitization do not 
track with its legal formalities; securitization is the apotheosis of legal form over substance, but 
punctilious respect for formalities is critical for securitization to work. 
Mortgage servicers provide the critical link between mortgage borrowers and the SPV 
and RMBS investors, and servicing arrangements are an indispensable part of securitization.22  
Mortgage servicing has become particularly important with the growth of the securitization 
market.   
                                                
19 A REMIC is a real estate mortgage investment conduit, as defined under I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G. 
20 See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1093-98. (2009). 
21 See Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753, 754 (2004). 
22 The servicing of nonsecuritized loans may also be outsourced.  There is little information about this market because it does not 
involve publicly available contracts and does not show up in standard data. 
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Figure 2.  Private-Label Mortgage Securitization Structure23 
 
 
B.  THE MORTGAGE SERVICING BUSINESS24 
The nature of the servicing business in general militates toward economies of scale and 
automation.   Servicing combines three distinct lines of business:  transaction processing, default 
management, and loss mitigation.  Transaction processing is a highly automatable business, 
characterized by large economies of scale.  Default management involves collections and 
activities related to taking defaulted loans through foreclosure.  Like transaction processing, 
                                                
23 See ACE Sec. Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC3, Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) S-11 (Nov. 21, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1380884/000114420406049985/v058926_424b5.htm. 
24 This section of my testimony comes from Adam J. Levitin & Larry Cordell, What RMBS Servicing Can Learn from CMBS 
Servicing, working paper, November 2010.   
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default management can be automated,25 as it does not require any negotiation with the 
homeowner, insurers, or junior lienholders.26  
Loss mitigation is considered an alternative to foreclosure, and includes activities such as 
repayment plans, loan modifications, short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure. Loss mitigation 
is always a negotiated process and is therefore labor-intensive and expensive. Not only must the 
homeowner be agreeable to any loss mitigation solution, but so too must mortgage insurers and 
junior lienholders if they are parties on the loan.  Because each negotiation is separate and 
requires a trained employee, there are very few opportunities for automation or economies of 
scale.  Labor expenses are also considered overhead, which are all non-reimbursable expenses to 
servicers.  And, to the extent that loss mitigation is in the form of a loan modification, redefault 
and self-cure risk always lurk in the background.   Moreover, loss mitigation must generally be 
conducted in addition to default management; the servicer must proceed with foreclosure even if 
attempting to find an alternative, so the cost of loss mitigation is additive.  Yet, while taking a 
loan through foreclosure is likely to involve lower costs than pursuing loss mitigation, it may not 
ultimately maximize value for RMBS investors because loss severities in foreclosure can easily 
surpass those on a re-performing restructured loan.   
The balance between these different parts of a servicer’s business changes over the 
course of the housing cycle.  When the housing market is strong, the transaction processing 
dominates the servicing business, but when the housing market is weak, default management and 
loss mitigation become more important.   
The very short weighted average life (WAL) of RMBS trusts combined with very low 
defaults in most economic environments encouraged servicers to place disproportionate weight 
on performing loan servicing, which historically has been characterized by small servicing fees 
and enormous economies of scale.  Thus, on a typical loan balance of $200,000 today, a servicer 
might earn between $500 and $1,000 per year.27  Given the low-level of annual income per loan, 
the short WAL of each loan, and low default rates in most economic environments before 2006, 
servicers had few incentives to devote resources to loss mitigation, but large incentives to invest 
in performing loan automation to capture the large economies of scale.  This left servicers wholly 
unprepared for the elevated level of defaults that began in 2007.   
 
C.  RMBS SERVICER COMPENSATION  
 RMBS servicers’ duties and compensation are set forth in a document called a “Pooling 
and Servicing” agreement (PSA) also governs the rights of the RMBS certificate holders.  RMBS 
servicers are compensated in four ways.  First, they receive a “servicing fee,” which is a flat fee 
of 25—50 basis points (bps) and is a first priority payment in the RMBS trust.28  This is by far 
the greatest portion of servicer income. This fee is paid out proportionately across all loans 
regardless of servicer costs through the economic cycle. 
                                                
25  See In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d 2010 WL 624909 (E.D. Pa. 2010).  
26 Arguably servicers have a fourth line of business—the management of real estate owned (REO).  REO are foreclosed properties that 
were not purchased by third-parties at the foreclosure sale.  REO management involves caring for and marketing the REO.  It does not require 
negotiations with the homeowner (who is evicted) or junior lienholders (whose liens are generally extinguished by the foreclosure).  
27 Servicing fees are generally 25—50 bps, which translates into $500--$1000 per year in servicing fees. 
28 Generally the servicing fee is 25 bps for conventional fixed rate mortgages, 37.5 bps for conventional ARM loans, 44 bps for 
government loans and 50 bps for subprime. 
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Second, servicers earn “float” income.  Servicers generally collect mortgage payments at 
the beginning of the month, but are not required to remit the payments to the trust until the 25th 
of the month.  In the interim, servicers invest the funds they have collected from the mortgagors, 
and they retain all investment income. Servicers can also obtain float income from escrow 
balances collected monthly from borrowers to pay taxes and insurance during the course of the 
year.   
Third, servicers are generally permitted to retain all ancillary fees they can collect from 
mortgagors.  This includes things like late fees and fees for balance checks or telephone 
payments.  It also includes fees for expenses involved in handling defaulted mortgages, such as 
inspecting the property.  Finally, servicers can hold securities themselves directly as investors, 
and often hold the junior-most, residual tranche in the securitization.   
 Servicers face several costs. In addition to the operational expenses of sending out billing 
statements, processing payments, maintaining account balances and histories, and restructuring 
or liquidating defaulted loans, private label RMBS servicers face the expense of “servicing 
advances.”29  When a loan defaults, the servicer is responsible for advancing the missed 
payments of principal and interest to the trust as well as paying taxes and insurance on the 
property. They continue to pay clear through liquidation of the property, unless these advances 
are not deemed recoverable.   
The servicer is able to recover advances it has made either from liquidation proceeds or 
from collections on other loans in the pool, but the RMBS servicer does not receive interest on 
its advances.  Therefore, advances can be quite costly to servicers in terms of the time value of 
money and can also place major strains on servicers’ liquidity, as the obligation to make 
advances continues until the loan is liquidated or the servicer believes that it is unlikely to be 
able to recover the advances.   In some cases, servicers have to advance years’ worth of 
mortgage payments to the trust.   
 While RMBS servicers do not receive interest on servicing advances, they are 
compensated for their “out-of-pocket” expenses.  This includes any expenses spent on preserving 
the collateral property, including force-placed insurance, legal fees, and other foreclosure-related 
expenses.  Large servicers frequently “in-source” default management expenses to their 
affiliates.    
 
D.  MONITORING OF RMBS SERVICERS 
RMBS servicing arrangements present a classic principal-agent problem wherein the 
agent’s incentives are not aligned with the principal and the principal has limited ability to 
monitor or discipline the agent.  
1.  Investors 
 Investors are poorly situated to monitor servicer behavior because they do not have direct 
dealings with the servicer.  RMBS investors lack information about servicer loss mitigation 
                                                
29 In Agency securities, servicers generally stop advancing after borrowers owe their fifth payment, at 120 days past due.  For GSE 
loans, they are then removed from the securities and taken on balance sheet. Servicer advances for the four payments are typically not reimbursed 
until termination.  
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activity.  Investors do not have access to detailed servicer expense reports or the ability to 
examine loss mitigation decisions.  Investors are able to see only the ultimate outcome.  This 
means that investors are limited in their ability to evaluate servicers’ performance on an ongoing 
basis.  And even if investors were able to detect unfaithful agents, they have little ability to 
discipline them short of litigation. 
2.  Trustees 
RMBS feature a trustee, but the name is deceptive.  The trustee is not a common law 
trustee with general fiduciary duties.  Instead, it is a limited purpose corporate trustee whose 
duties depend on whether there has been a default as defined UN the PSA.  A failure to pay all 
tranches their regularly scheduled principal and interest payments is not an event of default.  
Instead, default relates to the financial condition of the servicer, whether the servicer has made 
required advances to the trust, whether the servicer has submitted its monthly report, and whether 
the servicer has failed to meet any of its covenants under the PSA.   
Generally, before there is an event of default, the trustee has a few specifically assigned 
ministerial duties and no others.30  These duties are typically transmitting funds from the trust to 
the RMBS investors and providing investors performance statements based on figures provided 
by the servicer. The trustee’s pre-default duties do not include active monitoring of the servicer.  
Trustees are generally entitled to rely on servicers’ data reporting, and have little 
obligation to analyze it.31  Indeed, as Moody’s has noted, trustees lack the ability to verify most 
data reported by servicers; at best they can ensure that the reported data complies with any 
applicable covenant ratios:   
The trustee is not in a position to verify certain of the numbers reported by the 
servicer. For example, the amount of delinquent receivables and the amount of 
receivables charged off in a given month are figures that are taken from the 
servicer’s own computer systems. While these numbers could be verified by an 
auditor, they are not verifiable by the trustee.32   
Likewise, as attorney Susan Macaulay has observed, “In most cases, even if the servicer 
reports are incorrect, or even fraudulent, absent manifest error, the trustee simply has no way of 
knowing that there is a problem, and must allocate the funds into the appropriate accounts, and 
make the mandated distributions, in accordance with the servicer reports.”33   
                                                
30 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR10 Trust § 8.01 (“Prior to the occurrence of an Event of Default of 
which a Responsible Officer of the Trustee shall have actual knowledge and after the curing of all such Events of Default which may have 
occurred, the duties and obligations of the Trustee shall be determined solely by the express provisions of this Agreement, the Trustee shall not be 
liable except for the performance of such duties and obligations as are specifically set forth in this Agreement, no implied covenants or 
obligations shall be read into this Agreement against the Trustee and, in the absence of bad faith on the part of the Trustee, the Trustee may 
conclusively rely, as to the truth of the statements and the correctness of the opinions expressed therein, upon any certificates or opinions 
furnished to the Trustee, and conforming to the requirements of this Agreement.”).  See also Moody’s Investor Service, Structured Finance 
Ratings Methodology:  Moody’s Re-examines Trustees’ Role in ABS and RMBS, Feb. 4, 2003, at 4. (noting “Some trustees have argued that 
their responsibilities are limited to strictly administrative functions as detailed in the transaction documents and that they have no "fiduciary" duty 
prior to an event of default.”).  
31 MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 519 F. Supp. 2d 455 (2007), aff’d 321 Fed. Appx. 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Royal argues that 
Wells Fargo [the trustee] had the contractual obligation to analyze data using certain financial accounting principles and to detect any anomalies 
that analysis might have uncovered. As Royal suggests, this analysis may not have been very labor-intensive. Yet, the contract did not call for any 
analysis at all. It simply required Wells Fargo to perform rote comparisons between that data and data contained in various other sources, and to 
report any numerical inconsistencies. Wells Fargo did just that.”). 
32 Moody’s Investor Service, supra note 30, at 4. 
33 Susan J. Macaulay, US:  The Role of the Securitisation Trustee, GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 2004.  
Macaulay further notes that: 
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Similarly, trustees usually wait for servicers to notify them of defaults,34 and Moody’s 
has noted that trustees are often unresponsive to information from third parties indicating that an 
unreported default might have occurred.35  Thus, trustees enforce servicer representations and 
warranties largely on the honor system of servicer self-reporting.  
For private-label securities, trustees also lack the incentive to engage in more vigorous 
monitoring of servicer loss mitigation decisions.  The trustee does not get paid more for more 
vigorous monitoring.  The trustee generally has little ability to discipline the servicer except for 
litigation. Private-label RMBS trustees have almost no ability to fire or discipline a servicer.  
Servicers can only be dismissed for specified acts, and these acts are typically limited to the 
servicer’s insolvency or failure to remit funds to the trust.  Occasionally servicers may be 
dismissed if default levels exceed particular thresholds.  
Trustees also have no interest in seeing a servicer dismissed because they often are 
required to step in as back-up servicer.36  In the event of a servicer default, the trustee takes over 
as servicer (which includes the option of subcontracting the duties), and assumes the duty of 
making servicing advances to the trust.  The back-up servicer role is essentially an insurance 
policy for investors, and activation of that role is equivalent to payment on a claim; a trustee that 
has to act as a back-up servicer is likely to lose money in the process, especially when some of 
the trustees do not themselves own servicing operations.   
Trustees also often have close relationships with particular servicers.  For example, 
Professor Tara Twomey and I have shown that Bank of America/Countrywide accounts for 
nearly two-thirds of Deutsche Bank’s RMBS trustee business.37  In such circumstances, trustees 
are unlikely to engage in meaningful monitoring and disciplining of servicers.38 Amherst 
Securities points out that early payment default provisions are not effectively enforced by 
trustees, to the point where in cases where borrowers did not make a single payment on the 
mortgage, only 37 percent were purchased out of the trust, much smaller amounts for loans 
making only one to six payments.39   Thus, for private-label RMBS, there is virtually no 
supervision of servicers.40 
GSE and Ginnie Mae securitization have greater oversight of servicers. The GSEs serve 
as master servicers on most of their RMBS; they therefore have a greater ability to monitor 
servicer compliance. The GSEs require servicers to foreclose according to detailed timelines, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
It is almost always an event of default under the indenture if the trustee does not receive a servicer report within a specified period of 
time, and the trustee must typically report such a failure to the investors, any credit enhancement provider, the rating agencies and others. 
However, the trustee generally has no duties beyond that with respect to the contents of the report, although under the TIA, the trustee must 
review any reports furnished to it to determine whether there is any violation of the terms of the indenture. Presumably this would include 
verifying that any ratios represented in any reports conform to financial covenants contained in the indenture, etc. It would not however, require 
the trustee to go beyond the face of the report, i.e. to conduct further investigation to determine whether the data underlying the information on 
the reports presented to it were, in fact, true. Virtually all indentures, whether or not governed by the TIA, explicitly permit the trustee to rely on 
statements made to the trustee in officers’ certificates, opinions of counsel and documents delivered to the trustee in the manner specified within 
the indenture. 
Id.  
34 Moody’s Investor Service, supra note 30, at 4. 
35 Id.   
36 Eric Gross, Portfolio Management: The Evolution of Backup Servicing, Portfolio Financial Servicing Company (PFSC) 
(July 11, 2002) at http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/article.asp?id=147&aid=2047. 
37 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2011).  
38 See Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00421-LY, W.D. Tex., Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, 
July 10, 2007 (RMBS residual tranche holder alleging that trustee was aware that servicer was in violation of PSA and failed to act).    
39 See Amherst Mortgage Insight, “The Elephant in the Room—Conflicts of Interest in Residential Mortgage Securitizations”, 15, 
May 20, 2010. 
40 For MBS with separate master and primary servicers, the master servicer may monitor the primary servicer(s), but often the master 
and primary servicers are the same entity.   
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servicers that fail to comply face monetary penalties. Recognizing the benefits inherent in 
effective loss mitigation, Fannie Mae places staff directly in all of the largest servicer shops to 
work alongside loss mitigation staff at their servicers.41  Freddie Mac constructed servicer 
performance profiles to directly monitor servicers, sharing results directly with servicers and 
rating agencies. Since each GSE insures against credit losses on the loans, their ongoing 
monitoring provides consistent rules and a single point of contact to approve workout packages 
and grant exceptions, something absent in private label RMBS.   
3.  Ratings and Reputation  
 Like any repeat transaction business, servicers are concerned about their reputations.  But 
reputational sanctions have only very weak discipline on servicer behavior.   
 While Regulation AB requires servicers to disclose information about their experience 
and practices,42 they are not required to disclose information about performance of past pools 
they have serviced.  In any event, reputational sanctions are ineffective because loss severities 
are more likely to be attributed to underwriting quality than to servicing decisions. 
 Rating agencies also produce servicer ratings, but these ratings are a compilation of the 
evaluation of servicers on a multitude of characteristics.  Rating agencies have been known to 
incorporate features of Freddie Mac’s servicer performance profiles in their servicer assessments 
and to incorporate loss mitigation performance into their ratings. But details of their 
methodology used to measure these assessments are not disclosed. They give no indication of 
whether a servicer is likely to make loss mitigation decisions based solely on the interests of the 
securitization trust.  Ratings are also combined with other criteria, such as the servicer’s own 
financial strength and operational capacity.  In other words, servicer ratings go to the question of 
whether a servicer will have to be replaced because it is insolvent or lacks the ability to service 
the loans, with much less weight given to whether the servicer acts in the investors’ interests.   
 
C.  THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT AND FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
The mortgage contract consists of two documents, a promissory note (the “note” or the 
“mortgage loan”) and a security instrument (the “mortgage” or the “deed of trust”).43  The note is 
the IOU that contains the borrower’s promise to repay the money loaned.  If the note is a 
negotiable instrument, meaning that it complies with the requirements for negotiability in Article 
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,44 then the original physical note is itself the right to 
payment.45   
The mortgage is the document that connects the IOU with the house.  The mortgage gives 
the lender a contingent right to the house; it provides that if the borrower does not pay according 
to the terms of the note, then the lender can foreclose and have the property sold according to the 
                                                
41 PMI insurers have recently started to embed staff in servicer shops to monitor loss mitigation efforts.  Harry Terris & Kate Berry, In 
the Trenches, AM. BANKER, Aug. 27, 2009.   
42 17 C.F.R. § 229.1108.   
43 The note and the mortgage can be combined in a single document, but that is not common practice, both because the mortgage can 
be granted subsequent to the creation of the debt and because of borrower privacy concerns about the terms of the note, which would become 
public if the note and mortgage were combined and recorded in local property records.   
44 See UCC 3-104. 
45 UCC 3-203, Cmt. 1 (“An instrument is a reified right to payment.  The right is represented by the instrument itself.”).  
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terms of the mortgage and applicable state and federal law.  The applicable law governing 
foreclosures is state law.46   
State real estate law, including foreclosure law, is non-uniform, making it difficult to 
state what the law is as a generic matter; there is always the possibility that some jurisdictions 
may deviate from the majority rule.  That said, no state requires a borrower’s note to be recorded 
in local land records for the note to be valid, and, as a general matter, state law does not require 
the mortgage to be recorded either in order for the mortgage to be enforceable against the 
borrower.  Recording of the mortgage is necessary, however, to establish the mortgage’s priority 
relative to the claims of other parties, including other mortgagees, judgment lien creditors and 
tax and workmen’s’ liens against the property.  The basic rule of priority is first in time, first in 
right; the first mortgage to be recorded has senior priority.  An unrecorded mortgage will thus, 
generally have junior priority to a subsequently issued, but recorded mortgage.  The difference 
between enforceability and priority is an important one, discussed in more detail below, in the 
section of this testimony dealing with MERS.     
State law on foreclosures is also non-uniform.  Roughly, however, states can be divided 
into two groups:  those where foreclosure actions are conducted through the courts (“judicial 
foreclosure”) and those where foreclosure actions are conducted by private sales (“nonjudicial 
foreclosure”).  This division maps, imperfectly, with whether the preferred security instrument is 
a mortgage or a deed of trust.47   
Mortgage loans cost more in states that have judicial foreclosure; what this means is that 
borrowers in judicial foreclosure states are paying more for additional procedural rights and legal 
protections; those procedural rights are part of the mortgage contract; failure to honor them is a 
breach of the mortgage contract.  Note, that a default on the mortgage note is not a breach of the 
contract per se; instead it merely triggers the lender’s right to foreclose per the applicable 
procedure.   
In a typical judicial foreclosure proceeding, the homeowner receives a notice of default 
and if that default is not cured within the required period, the mortgagee then files a foreclosure 
action in court.  The action is commenced by the filing of a written complaint that sets forth the 
mortgagee’s allegations that the homeowner owes a debt that is secured by a mortgage and that 
the homeowner has defaulted on the debt.  Rules of civil procedure generally require that legal 
actions based upon a writing include a copy of the writing as an attachment to the complaint, 
although there is sometimes an exception for writings that are available in the public records.  
While the mortgage is generally filed in the public records, assignments of the mortgage are 
often not (an issue complicated by MERS, discussed below), and the note is almost never a 
matter of public record.   
It is important to understand that most judicial foreclosures do not function like the sort 
of judicial proceeding that is dramatized on television, in which all parties to the case appear in 
court, represented by attorneys and judgment only follows a lengthy trial.  Instead, the norm in 
foreclosure cases is a default judgment.  Most borrowers do not appear in court or contest their 
                                                
46 There is a federal foreclosure statute that can be utilized by the federal government.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3713 (multi-family 
property foreclosures); §§3751-3768 (single-family property foreclosures).  
47 Mortgages sometimes also include a power of sale, permitting nonjudicial foreclosure.  In a deed of trust, the deed to the property is 
transferred in trust for the noteholder to a deed of trust trustee, often a local attorney.  The note remains the property of the lender (the deed of 
trust beneficiary).  When there is a default on the note, the lender notifies the deed of trust trustee and the lender or its agent is typically appointed 
as substitute deed of trust trustee to run the foreclosure sale.   
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foreclosures, and not all of those who do are represented by competent counsel, not least because 
of the difficulties in paying for counsel.  Most borrowers that the borrower does not contest the 
foreclosure or appear in court.  In most cases, only the lender’s attorney appears, and judges 
routinely dispatch dozens or hundreds of foreclosure cases in a sitting.  Homeowners in 
foreclosure actions are among the most vulnerable of defendants, the least able to insist up on 
and vindicate their rights, and accordingly the ones most susceptible to abuse of legal process.   
 
II. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AND FRAUD 
 
The first type of problems in the mortgage market are what might generously be termed 
“procedural defects” or “procedural irregularities.”  There are numerous such problems that have 
come to light in foreclosure cases.  The extent and distribution of these irregularities is not yet 
known.  No one has compiled a complete typology of procedural defects in foreclosures; there 
are, to use Donald Rumsfeld’s phrase, certainly “known unknowns” and well as “unknown 
unknowns.”   
 
A.  AFFIDAVITS FILED WITHOUT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (ROBOSIGNING) 
 Affidavits need to be based on personal knowledge to have any evidentiary effect; absent 
personal knowledge an affidavit is hearsay and therefore generally inadmissible as evidence.  
Accordingly, affidavits attest to personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein.   
 The most common type of affidavit is an attestation about the existence and status of the 
loan, namely that the homeowner owes a debt, how much is currently owed, and that the 
homeowner has defaulted on the loan.  (Other types of affidavits are discussed in sections II.B. 
and II.C., infra).  Such an affidavit is typically sworn out by an employee of a servicer (or 
sometimes by a law firm working for a servicer).  Personal knowledge for such an affidavit 
would involve, at the very least, examining the payment history for a loan in the servicer’s 
computer system and checking it against the facts alleged in a complaint.   
 The problem with affidavits filed in many foreclosure cases is that the affiant lacks any 
personal knowledge of the facts alleged whatsoever.  Many servicers, including Bank of 
America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and GMAC, employ professional affiants, 
some of whom appear to have no other duties than to sign affidavits.  These employees cannot 
possibly have personal knowledge of the facts in their affidavits.  One GMAC employee, Jeffrey 
Stephan, stated in a deposition that he signed perhaps 10,000 affidavits in a month, or 
approximately 1 a minute for a 40-hour work week.48  For a servicer’s employee to ascertain 
payment histories in a high volume of individual cases is simply impossible.   
 When a servicer files an affidavit that claims to be based on personal knowledge, but is 
not in fact based on personal knowledge, the servicer is committing a fraud on the court, and 
quite possibly perjury.  The existence of foreclosures based on fraudulent pleadings raises the 
                                                
48 See Deposition of Jeffrey Stephan, GMAC Mortgage  LLC v. Ann M. Neu a/k/a Ann Michelle Perez, No. 50 2008 CA 
040805XXXX MB, (15th Judicial Circuit, Florida, Dec. 10, 2009) at 7, available at  
http://api.ning.com/files/s4SMwlZXvPu4A7kq7XQUsGW9xEcYtqNMPCm0a2hISJu88PoY6ZNqanX7XK41Fyf9gV8JIHDme7KcFO2cvHqSE
McplJ8vwnDT/091210gmacmortgagevsannmneu1.pdf (stating that Jeffrey Stephan, a GMAC employee, signed approximately 10,000 affidavits 
a month for foreclosure cases). 
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question of the validity of foreclosure judgments and therefore title on properties, particularly if 
they are still in real estate owned (REO). 
 
B.  LOST NOTE AFFIDAVITS FOR NOTES THAT ARE NOT LOST 
 The plaintiff in a foreclosure action is generally required to produce the note as evidence 
that it has standing to foreclose.  Moreover, under the Uniform Commercial Code, if the note is a 
negotiable instrument, only a holder of the note (or a subrogee)—that is a party in possession of 
the note— may enforce the note, as the note is the reified right to payment.49   
There is an exception, however, for lost, destroyed, or stolen notes, which permits a party 
that has lost possession of a note to enforce it.50  If a plaintiff seeks to enforce a lost note, it is 
necessary “to prove the terms of the instrument” as well as the “right to enforce the 
instrument.”51  This proof is typically offered in the form of a lost note affidavit that attests to the 
prior existence of the note, the terms of the note, and that the note has been lost.   
It appears that a surprisingly large number of lost note affidavits are filed in foreclosure 
cases.  In Broward County, Florida alone, over 2000 such affidavits were filed in 2008-2009.52  
Relative to the national population, that translates to roughly 116,000 lost note affidavits 
nationally over the same period.53   
 There are two problems with the filing of many lost note affidavits.  First, is a lack of 
personal knowledge.  Mortgage servicers are rarely in possession of the original note.  Instead, 
the original note is maintained in the fireproof vault of the securitization trustee’s document 
custodian.  This means that the servicer lacks personal knowledge about whether a note has or 
has not been lost.54  Merely reporting a communication from the document custodian would be 
hearsay and likely inadmissible as evidence.   
 The second problem is that the original note is frequently not in fact lost.  Instead, it is in 
the document custodian’s vault.  Servicers do not want to pay the document custodian a fee (of 
perhaps $30) to release the original mortgage, and servicers are also wary of entrusting the 
original note to the law firms they hire.  Substitution of counsel is not infrequent on defaulted 
mortgages, and servicers are worried that the original note will get lost in the paperwork shuffle 
if there is a change in counsel.  When pressed, however, servicers will often produce the original 
note, months after filing lost note affidavits.  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) requires 
that a party seeking to enforce a note be a holder (or subrogee to a holder) or produce evidence 
that a note has been lost, destroyed, or stolen; the UCC never contemplates an “inconvenience 
affidavit” that states that it is too much trouble for a servicer to bother obtaining the original 
note.  But that is precisely what many lost note affidavits are effectively claiming.   
 Thus, many lost note affidavits are doubly defective:  they are sworn out by a party that 
does not and cannot have personal knowledge of the alleged facts and the facts being alleged are 
                                                
49 UCC 3-301; 1-201(b)(21) (defining “holder”).    
50 UCC 3-309.  Note that UCC 3-309 was amended in the 2001 revision of Article 3.  The revision made it easier to enforce a lost 
note.  Not every state has adopted the 2001 revisions.  Therefore, UCC 3-309 is non-uniform law.    
51 UCC 3-309(b).  
52 Gretchen Morgenson & Andrew Martin, Battle Lines Forming in Clash Over Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A1.   
53 According to the US Census Bureau, Broward County’s population is approximately 1.76 million, making it .57% of the total US 
population of 307 million.  Broward does have a significantly higher than average foreclosure rate, roughly 12% over the past two years, 
according to Core Logic Loan Performance data, making it approximately 3 times the national average.     
54 The 2001 version of UCC 3-309 permits not only a party that has lost a note but a buyer from such a party to enforce a lost note.   
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often false as the note is not in fact lost, but the servicer simply does not want to bother obtaining 
it.    
 
C.  JUNK FEES 
 The costs of foreclosure actions are initially incurred by servicers, but servicers recover 
these fees off the top from foreclosure sale proceeds before MBS investors are paid.  This 
reimbursement structure limits servicers’ incentive to rein in costs and actually incentives them 
to pad the costs of foreclosure.  This is done in two ways.  First, servicers charge so-called “junk 
fees” either for unnecessary work or for work that was simply never done.  Thus, Professor Kurt 
Eggert has noted a variety of abusive servicing practices, including “improper foreclosures or 
attempted foreclosures; imposition of improper fees, especially late fees; forced-placed insurance 
that is not required or called for; and misuse of escrow funds.”55  Servicers’ ability to retain 
foreclosure-related fees has even led them to attempt to foreclose on properties when the 
homeowners are current on the mortgage or without attempting any sort of repayment plan.56  
Consistently, Professor Katherine Porter has documented that when mortgage creditors file 
claims in bankruptcy, they generally list amounts owed that are much higher than those 
scheduled by debtors.57   
There is also growing evidence of servicers requesting payment for services not 
performed or for which there was no contractual right to payment.  For example, in one 
particularly egregious case from 2008, Wells Fargo filed a claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy 
case that included the costs of two brokers’ price opinions allegedly obtained in September 2005, 
on a property in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana when the entire Parish was under an evacuation 
order due to Hurricane Katrina.58  
Similarly, there is a frequent problem of so-called “sewer summons” issued (or actually 
not issued) to homeowners in foreclosures.  Among the costs of foreclosure actions is serving 
notice of the foreclosure (a court summons) on the homeowner.  There is disturbing evidence 
that homeowners are being charged for summons that were never issued.  These non-delivered 
summons are known as “sewer summons” after their actual delivery destination.  
One way in which these non-existent summons are documented is through the filing of 
“affidavits of lost summons” by process servers working for the foreclosure attorneys hired by 
mortgage servicers. A recent article reports that in Duval County, Florida (Jacksonville) the 
number of affidavits of lost summons has ballooned from 1,031 from 2000-2006 to over 4,000 in 
the last two years, a suspiciously large increase that corresponds with a sharp uptick in 
foreclosures.59 
Because of concerns about illegal fees, the United States Trustee’s Office has undertaken 
several investigations of servicers’ false claims in bankruptcy60 and brought suit against 
                                                
55 Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership 
Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279 (2007). 
56 Eggert, Limiting Abuse, supra note 21, at 757. 
57  Katherine M. Porter, Mortgage Misbehavior, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 162 (2008).  
58 In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327, 355 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008). 
59 Matt Taibi, Courts Helping Banks Screw Over Homeowners, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 25, 2010, at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/232611?RS_show_page=7.   
60 Ashby Jones, U.S. Trustee Program Playing Tough With Countrywide, Others, LAW BLOG (Dec. 3, 2007, 10:01 AM), at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/12/03/us-trustee-program-playing-tough-with-countrywide-others. 
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Countrywide,61 while the Texas Attorney General has sued American Home Mortgage Servicing 
for illegal debt collection practices.62 
The other way in which servicers pad the costs of foreclosure is by in-sourcing their 
expenses to affiliates at above-market rates. For example, Countrywide, the largest RMBS 
servicer, force places insurance on defaulted properties with its captive insurance affiliate 
Balboa.63  Countrywide has been accused of deliberately extending the time to foreclosure in 
order to increase the insurance premiums paid to its affiliate, all of which are reimbursable by the 
trust, before the RMBS investors’ claims are paid.64  Similarly, Countrywide in-sources trustee 
services in deed of trust foreclosures to its subsidiary Recon Trust.65 
Thus, in Countrywide’s’ 2007 third quarter earnings call, Countrywide’s President David 
Sambol emphasized that increased revenue from in-sourced default management functions could 
offset losses from mortgage defaults.   
Now, we are frequently asked what the impact on our servicing costs and earnings 
will be from increased delinquencies and loss mitigation efforts, and what 
happens to costs. And what we point out is, as I will now, is that increased 
operating expenses in times like this tend to be fully offset by increases in 
ancillary income in our servicing operation, greater fee income from items like 
late charges, and importantly from in-sourced vendor functions that represent part 
of our diversification strategy, a counter-cyclical diversification strategy such as 
our businesses involved in foreclosure trustee and default title services and 
property inspection services.66 
In June, 2010, Countrywide settled with the FTC for $108 million on charges that it overcharged 
delinquent homeowners for default management services.  According to the FTC,  
Countrywide ordered property inspections, lawn mowing, and other services 
meant to protect the lender’s interest in the property… But rather than simply hire 
third-party vendors to perform the services, Countrywide created subsidiaries to 
hire the vendors. The subsidiaries marked up the price of the services charged by 
the vendors – often by 100% or more – and Countrywide then charged the 
homeowners the marked-up fees.67 
Among the accusations brought against Countrywide in a recent investor notice of default filed 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York along with BlackRock and PIMCO, is that 
Countrywide has been padding expenses via in-sourcing on the 115 trusts covered by the letter.68   
                                                
61 Complaint, Walton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Atchely), No. 05-79232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. filed Feb. 28, 2008). 
62 Complaint, State v. Am. Home Mtg. Servicing, Inc., No. 2010-3307 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 448th Jud. Dist. filed Aug. 30, 2010). 
63 Amherst Mortgage Insight, 2010, “The Elephant in the Room—Conflicts of Interest in Residential Mortgage Securitizations,” 23, 
May 20, 2010. 
64 Id.   
65 Center for Responsible Lending, Unfair and Unsafe: How Countrywide’s irresponsible practices have harmed borrowers and 
shareholders, CRL Issue Paper, Feb. 7, 2008, at 6-7. 
66 Transcript, “Countrywide Financial Corporation Q3 2007 Earnings Call,” Oct. 26, 2007 (emphasis added) (also mentioning “Our 
vertical diversification businesses, some of which I mentioned, are counter-cyclical to credit cycles, like the lender-placed property business in 
Balboa and like the in-source vendor businesses in our loan administration unit.”). 
67 FTC, Press Release, June 7, 2010, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for Overcharging Struggling Homeowners; Loan Servicer 
Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans of Borrowers in Bankruptcy. 
68 Kathy D. Patrick, Letter to Countrywide Home Loan Servicing LP and the Bank of New York, dated Oct. 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.scribd.com/Bondholders-Letter-to-BofA-Over-Countrywide-Loans-inc-NY-Fed/d/39686107. 
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Countrywide is hardly the only servicer accused of acting in its interests at the expense of 
investors.  Carrington, another major servicer, also owns the residual tranche on many of the 
deals it services.  Amherst Mortgage Securities has shown that Carrington has been much slower 
than other servicers to liquidate defaulted loans.69  Delay benefits Carrington both as a servicer 
and as the residual tranche investor.  As a servicer, delay helps Carrington by increasing the 
number of monthly late fees that it can levy on the loans.  These late fees are paid from 
liquidation proceeds before any of the MBS investors.   
As an investor in the residual tranche, Carrington has also been accused of engaging in 
excessive modifications to both capture late fees and to keep up the excess spread in the deals, as 
it is paid directly to the residual holders.70  When loans were mass modified, Carrington 
benefited as the servicer by capitalizing late fees and advances into the principal balance of the 
modified loans, which increased the balance on which the servicing fee was calculated.  
Carrington also benefited as the residual holder by keeping up excess spread in the deals and 
delaying delinquency deal triggers that restrict payments to residual holders when delinquencies 
exceed specified levels.  Assuming that the residual tranche would be out of the money upon a 
timely foreclosure, delay means that Carrington, as the residual holder, receives many more 
months of additional payments on the MBS it holds than it otherwise would.71 
 It is important to emphasize that junk fees on homeowners ultimately come out of the 
pocket of MBS investors.  If the homeowner lacks sufficient equity in the property to cover the 
amount owed on the loan, including junk fees, then there is a deficiency from the foreclosure 
sale.  As many mortgages are legally or functionally non-recourse, this means that the deficiency 
cannot be collected from the homeowner’s other assets.  Mortgage servicers recover their 
expenses off the top in foreclosure sales, before MBS investors are paid.  Therefore, when a 
servicer lards on illegal fees in a foreclosure, it is stealing from investors such as pension plans 
and the US government.     
 
D.  COMPLAINTS THAT FAIL TO INCLUDE THE NOTE 
 Rule of civil procedure generally require that a compliant based on a writing include, as 
an attachment, a copy of a writing.  In a foreclosure action, this means that both the note and the 
mortgage and any assignments of either must be attached.  Beyond the rules of civil procedure 
requirement, these documents are also necessary as an evidentiary matter to establish that the 
plaintiff has standing to bring the foreclosure.  Some states have exceptions for public records, 
which may be incorporated by reference, but it is not always clear whether this exception applies 
in foreclosure actions.  If it does, then only the note, which is not a public record, would need to 
be attached.   
                                                
69 Amherst Mortgage Insight, 2010, “The Elephant in the Room—Conflicts of Interest in Residential Mortgage Securitizations”, pp. 
22-24, May 20, 2010.  
70 See Amherst Mortgage Insight, “Why Investors Should Oppose Servicer Safe Harbors”, April 28, 2009.  Excess spread is the 
difference between the income of the SPV in a given period and its payment obligations on the MBS in that period, essentially the SPV’s periodic 
profit.  Excess spread is accumulated to supplement future shortfalls in the SPV’s cashflow, but is either periodically released to the residual 
tranche holder.  Generally, as a further protection for senior MBS holders, excess spread cannot be released if certain triggers occur, like a decline 
in the amount of excess spread trapped in a period beneath a particular threshold.     
71 Carrington would still have to make servicing advances on any delinquent loans if it stretched out the time before foreclosure, but 
these advances would be reimbursable, and the reimbursement would come from senior MBS holders, rather than from Carrington, if it were out 
of the money in the residual.  
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 Many foreclosure complaints are facially defective and should be dismissed because they 
fail to attach the note.  I have recently examined a small sample of foreclosure cases filed in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh and environs) in May 2010.  In over 60% of those 
foreclosure filings, the complaint failed to include a copy of the note.  Failure to attach the note 
appears to be routine practice for some of the foreclosure mill law firms, including two that 
handle all of Bank of America’s foreclosures.  
I would urge the Committee to ask Bank of America whether this was an issue it 
examined in its internal review of its foreclosure practices.  
 
E.  COUNTERFEIT AND ALTERED DOCUMENTS AND NOTARY FRAUD 
 Perhaps the most disturbing problem that has appeared in foreclosure cases is evidence of 
counterfeit or altered documents and false notarizations.  To give some examples, there are cases 
in which multiple copies of the “true original note” are filed in the same case, with variations in 
the “true original note;”72 signatures on note allonges that have clearly been affixed to documents 
via Photoshop;73 “blue ink” notarizations that appear in blank ink; counterfeit notary seals;74 
backdated notarizations of documents issued before the notary had his or her commission;75 and 
assignments that include the words “bogus assignee for intervening asmts, whose address is 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.”76   
 Most worrisome is evidence that these frauds might not be one-off problems, but an 
integral part of the foreclosure business.  A price sheet from a company called DocEx that was 
affiliated with LPS, one of the largest servicer support firms, lists prices for various services 
including the “creation” of notes and mortgages.  While I cannot confirm the authenticity of this 
price sheet or date it, it suggests that document counterfeiting is hardly exceptional in foreclosure 
cases.   
While the fraud in these cases is not always by servicers themselves, but sometimes by 
servicer support firms or attorneys, its existence should raise serious concerns about the integrity 
of the foreclosure process.  I would urge the Committee to ask the servicer witnesses what steps 
they have taken to ascertain that they do not have such problems with loans in their servicing 
portfolios.   
 
G.  THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The critical question for gauging the risk presented by procedural defects is the extent of 
the defects.  While Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke has announced that federal bank 
regulators are looking into the issue and will issue a report this month, I do not believe that it is 
                                                
Brief of Antonio Ibanez, Defendant-Appellee, US Bank Nat’l Assn, as Trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation 
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z v. Ibanez; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee for ABFC 2005-Opt 1 Trust, ABFC Asset 
Backed Certificates Series 2005-OPT 1, No 10694, (Mass. Sept. 20, 2010), at 10 (detailing 3 different “certified true copies” of a note allonge 
and of an assignment of a mortgage); http://4closurefraud.org/2010/04/27/foreclosure-fraud-of-the-week-two-original-wet-ink-notes-submitted-
in-the-same-case-by-the-florida-default-law-group-and-jpmorgan-chase/ (detailing a foreclosure file with two different “original” wet ink notes 
for the same loan).   
73 http://4closurefraud.org/2010/04/08/foreclosure-fraud-of-the-week-poor-photoshop-skills/. 
74 See WSTB.com, at http://www.wsbtv.com/video/25764145/index.html. 
75 Deposition of Cheryl Samons, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2006-HE4 v. 
Pierre, No. 50-2008-CA-028558-XXXX-MB (15th Judicial Circuit, Florida, May 20, 2009, available at http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/depositionsammons.pdf.   
76 http://www.nassauclerk.com/clerk/publicrecords/oncoreweb/showdetails.aspx?id=809395&rn=0&pi=0&ref=search.   
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within the ability of federal bank regulators to gauge the extent of procedural defects in 
foreclosure cases.  To do so would require, at the very least, an extensive sampling of actual 
foreclosure filings and their examination by appropriately trained personnel.  I am unaware of 
federal bank regulators undertaking an examination of actual foreclosure filings, much less 
having a sufficient cadre of appropriately trained personnel.  Bank examiners lack the experience 
or training to evaluate legal documents like foreclosure filings.  Therefore, any statement put 
forth by federal regulators on the scope of procedural defects is at best a guess and at worse a 
parroting of the “nothing to see here folks” line that has come from mortgage servicers.   
I would urge the Committee to inquire with federal regulators as to exactly what steps 
they are taking to examine foreclosure irregularities and how they can be sure that those steps 
will uncover the extent of the problem.  Similarly, I would urge the Committee to ask the 
servicer witnesses what specific irregularities they examined during their self-imposed moratoria 
and by what process.  It defies credulity that a thorough investigation of all the potential 
problems in foreclosure paperwork could be completed in a month or two, much less by servicers 
that have taken so long to do a small number of loan modifications. 
 
III.  CHAIN OF TITLE PROBLEMS 
 
A second problem and potentially more serious problem relating to standing to foreclose 
is the issue of chain of title in mortgage securitizations.77  As explained above, securitization 
involves a series of transfers of both the note and the mortgage from originator to sponsor to 
depositor to trust.  This particular chain of transfers is necessary to ensure that the loans are 
“bankruptcy remote” once they have been placed in the trust, meaning that if any of the upstream 
transferors were to file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy estate could not lay claim to the loans in 
the trust by arguing that the transaction was not a true sale, but actually a secured loan.78  
Bankruptcy remoteness is an essential component of private-label mortgage securitization deals, 
as investors want to assume the credit risk solely of the mortgages, not of the mortgages’ 
originators or securitization sponsors.  Absent bankruptcy remoteness, the economics of 
mortgage securitization do not work in most cases.   
 Recently, arguments have been raised in foreclosure litigation about whether the notes 
and mortgages were in fact properly transferred to the securitization trusts.  This is a critical 
issue because the trust has standing to foreclose if, and only if it is the mortgagee.  If the notes 
and mortgages were not transferred to the trust, then the trust lacks standing to foreclose.   There 
are several different theories about the defects in the transfer process; I do not attempt to do 
justice to any of them in this testimony.   
                                                
77 Chain of title problems appear to be primarily a problem for private-label securitization, not for agency securitization because even 
if title were not properly transferred for Agency securities, it would have little consequence.  Investors would not have incurred a loss as the result 
of an ineffective transfer, as their MBS are guaranteed by the GSEs or Ginnie Mae, and when a loan in an Agency pool defaults, it is removed 
from the pool and the owned by the GSE or Ginnie Mae, which is then has standing to foreclose. 
78 Bankruptcy remote has a second meaning, namely that the trust cannot or will not file of bankruptcy.  This testimony uses 
bankruptcy remote solely in the sense of whether the trust’s assets could be clawed back into a bankruptcy estate via an equity of redemption. The 
Uniform Commercial Code permits a debtor to redeem collateral at face value of the debt owed.  If a pool of loans bore a now-above-market 
interest rate, the pool’s value could be above the face value of the debt owed, making redemption economically attractive.   
It can be very difficult to distinguish true sales from secured loans.  For example, a sale and repurchase agreement (a repo) is 
economically identical to a secured loan from the repo buyer to the repo seller, secured by the assets being sold.   
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 While the chain of title issue has arisen first in foreclosure defense cases, it also has 
profound implications for MBS investors.  If the notes and mortgages were not properly 
transferred to the trusts, then the mortgage-backed securities that the investors’ purchased were 
in fact non-mortgage-backed securities.  In such a case, investors would have a claim for the 
rescission of the MBS,79 meaning that the securitization would be unwound, with investors 
receiving back their original payments at par (possibly with interest at the judgment rate).  
Rescission would mean that the securitization sponsor would have the notes and mortgages on its 
books, meaning that the losses on the loans would be the securitization sponsor’s, not the MBS 
investors, and that the securitization sponsor would have to have risk-weighted capital for the 
mortgages.  If this problem exists on a wide-scale, there is not the capital in the financial system 
to pay for the rescission claims; the rescission claims would be in the trillions of dollars, making 
the major banking institutions in the United States would be insolvent.   
The key questions for evaluating chain of title are what method of transferring notes and 
mortgages is actually supposed to be used in securitization and whether that method is legally 
sufficient both as a generic matter and as applied in securitization deals.  There is a surprising 
lack of consensus on both counts.  Scholars and attorneys cannot agree either on what methods 
would work generically, much less determine which were used in securitization transactions.  
This means there is a great deal of legal uncertainty over these issues.  Even among banks’ 
attorneys, different arguments appear in different litigation.  For example, one possible method 
of transfer—a sale under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code—has never, to my 
knowledge, been made by banks’ attorneys in foreclosure litigation when chain of title has been 
questioned, even though it is one of the two methods that a recent American Securitization 
Forum (ASF) white paper argues is proper.80  Even among the banks’ lawyers, then, there is lack 
of consensus on what law governs transfers.  
The following section outlines the potential methods of transfer and some of the issues 
that arise regarding specific methods.  It is critical to emphasize that the law is not settled on 
most of the issues regarding securitization transfers; instead, these issues are just starting to be 
litigated.   
 
A.  TRANSFERS OF NOTES GENERALLY 
As a generic matter, a note can be transferred in one of four methods: 
(1) The note can be sold via a contract of sale, which would be governed by the common law 
of contracts.   
(2) If the note is a negotiable instrument,81 it could be negotiated, meaning that it would be 
transferred via endorsement and delivery, with the process governed by Article 3 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).82  The endorsement can either be a specific 
                                                
79 This claim would not be a putback claim necessarily, but could be brought as a general contract claim.  It could not be brought as a 
securities law claim under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 because the statute of limitations for rescission has expired on all PLS. 
80 American Securitization Forum, Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in the Secondary Mortgage Market, ASF 
White Paper Series, Nov. 16, 2010, at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf.  The ASF white 
paper notes that it has been reviewed and approved by 13 major (but unnamed) law firms.  The ASF white paper does not report whether any of 
these firms have outstanding opinion letter liability on securitization transactions.   
81 It is not clear whether mortgage notes are necessarily negotiable instruments.   
82 The note endorsement process works just like endorsements on checks and is governed by the same law.   
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endorsement to a named endorsee or an endorsement in blank that converts the note into 
bearer paper.   
(3) The note could be converted into an electronic note and transferred according to the 
provisions of the federal E-SIGN Act.83  
(4) The note could be sold pursuant to UCC Article 9, if it was sold after 2001.84  In 49 states 
(South Carolina being the exception), Article 9 provides a method for selling a 
promissory note, which requires that there be an authenticated (signed) agreement, value 
given, and that the seller have rights in the property being transferred.85  This process is 
very similar to a common law sale.   
 
B.  TRANSFERS OF MORTGAGES GENERALLY 
There is general agreement that as a generic method, any of these methods of transfer 
would work to effectuate a transfer of the note.  No method is mandatory.  Whether or not the 
chosen process was observed in practice, is another matter, however.86  Concerns about non-
compliance is discussed below.   
 There are also several conceivable ways to transfer mortgages, but there are serious 
doubts about the validity of some of the methods: 
(1) The mortgage could be assigned through the traditional common law process, which 
would require a document of assignment.  There is general consensus that this process 
works.   
(2) The mortgage could be negotiated.  This method of transfer is of questionable 
effectiveness.  A mortgage is not a negotiable instrument, and concepts of negotiability 
do not fit well with mortgages.  For example, if a mortgage were negotiated in blank, it 
should become a “bearer mortgage,” but this concept is utterly foreign to the law, not 
least as the thief of a bearer mortgage would have the ability to enforce the mortgage 
(absent equitable considerations).  Similarly, with a bearer mortgage, a homeowner could 
never figure out who would be required to grant a release of the mortgage upon payoff.  
And, in many states (so-called title theory states), a mortgage is considered actual 
ownership of real property, and real property must have a definite owner (not least for 
taxation purposes). 
(3) The mortgage could “follow the note” per common law.  While there is a good deal of 
case law using this mellifluous phrase, common law is not wholly settled on the principle, 
                                                
83 15 U.S.C. § 7021.  E-SIGN imposes a number of requirements on electronic note transfers and also requires consent of the issuer 
(maker) of the note.   
84 The revisions of UCC Articles 1 and 9 went into effect nationally in 2001.   
85 UCC 9-203.  The language of Article 9 is abstruse, but UCC Revised Article 1 defines "security interest" to include the interest of a 
buyer of a promissory note.  UCC 1-201(b)(35).  Article 9's definition of "debtor" includes a seller of a promissory note, UCC 9-102(a)(28)(B ), 
and "secured party" includes a buyer of a promissory note, UCC 9-102(a)(72)(D).  Therefore UCC 9-203, which would initially appear to address 
the attachment (enforceability) of a security interest also covers the sale of a promissory note. South Carolina has not adopted the revised Article 
1 definition of security interest necessary to make Article 9 apply to sales of promissory notes.  
86 Note that common law sales and Article 9 sales do not affect the enforceability of the note against the obligor on the note.  UCC 9-
308, Cmt.6, Ex. 3 (“Under this Article, attachment and perfection of a security interest in a secured right to payment do not of themselves affect 
the obligation to pay.  For example, if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note, then Article 3 dictates the person to whom the maker must 
pay to discharge the note and any lien security it.”). UCC Article 3 negotiation and E-SIGN do affect enforceability as they enable a buyer for 
value in good faith to be a holder in due course and thereby cut off some of the obligor’s defenses that could be raised against the seller.  UCC 3-
305, 3-306; 15 U.S.C. § 7021(d). 
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and its meaning is not entirely clear (e.g., does it mean that a transfer of the note 
effectuates a transfer of the mortgage or that the mortgage and the note cannot be 
separated and both must be transferred—by their own processes— in order for either 
transfer to work).  There are also several instances where the mortgage clearly does not 
follow the note.  For example, the basic concept of a deed of trust is that the security 
instrument and the note are separated; the deed of trust trustee holds the security, while 
the beneficiary holds the note.  Likewise, the mortgage follows the note concept would 
imply that the theft of a note also constitutes theft of a mortgage, thereby giving to a thief 
more than the thief was able to actually steal.  Another situation would be where a 
mortgage is given to a guarantor of a debt.  The mortgage would not follow the debt, but 
would (at best) follow the guarantee.  And finally, the use of MERS, a recording utility, 
as original mortgage (a/k/a MOM) splits the note and the mortgage.  MERS has no claim 
to the note, but MERS is the mortgagee.  If taken seriously, MOM means that the 
mortgage does not follow the note.  While MERS might claim that MOM just means that 
the beneficial interest in the mortgage follows the note, a transfer of the legal title would 
violate a bankruptcy stay and would constitute a voidable preference if done before 
bankruptcy.   
(4) the mortgage could “follow the note” if it is an Article 9 transfer.87  There is consensus 
that this process would work if Article 9 governs the transfer of the note. 
 
C.  TRANSFERS IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS 
All the methods described above for transferring notes and mortgages are simply generic 
methods.  There may be additional requirements for a valid transfer, either as a function of trust 
law or as agreed upon by the parties themselves by contract.  Notably, the American 
Securitization Forum’s white paper considers neither of these possibilities.88   
 
1.  Trust Law 
Trust law creates additional requirements for transfers.  RMBS typically involve a 
transfer of the assets to a New York common law trust.  Transfers to New York common law 
trusts are governed by the common law of gifts.  In New York, such a transfer requires actual 
delivery of the transferred assets in a manner such that no one else could possibly claim 
ownership.89  This is done to avoid fraudulent transfer concerns.  For a transfer to a New York 
common law trust, the mere recital of a transfer, is insufficient to effectuate a transfer;90 there 
must be delivery in as perfect a manner as possible.91  Similarly, an endorsement in blank might 
not be sufficient to effectuate a transfer to a trust because endorsement in blank turns a note into 
bearer paper to which others could easily lay claim. 
 
                                                
87 UCC 9-203(g). If the transfer is not an Article 9 transfer, then the Article 9 provision providing that the mortgage follows the note 
would not apply. 
88 See supra, note 80. 
89 See Vincent v. Putnam, 248 N.Y. 76, 83 (N.Y. 1928) (“The delivery must be such as to vest the donee with the control and 
dominion over the property and to absolutely divest the donor of his dominion and control, and the delivery must be made with the intent to vest 
the title of the property in the donee….Equity will not help out an incomplete delivery.”). 
90 Id. at 84 (“Mere words never constitute a delivery.”).   
91 In re Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 309 (N.Y. 1913). 
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2. Private Contract 
 The UCC is simply a set of default rules.92  Parties are free to contract around it, and need 
not do so explicitly.93  Parties can thus impose by contract additional requirements for transfers 
to those in Articles 3 and 9 or, alternatively, ease the requirements.  PSAs appear to be precisely 
this type of variation by agreement from the UCC.  If so, then they would govern the transfers as 
a simple matter of contract law.  Deviation from the PSA requirements would be allowed, but 
only by the extent permitted by contract law, and even if there were a deviation that constituted a  
material breach of the contract, it would not void the transfer on a self-executing basis.   
 
3.  Private Contract + Trust Law 
Trust law and private contract law combine to make a much more rigid set of transfer 
requirements that contract law would by itself.  New York law provides that a trustee’s authority 
is limited to that provided in the trust documents.94  New York law also provides that any 
transfer in contravention of the trust documents is void.95  Therefore, if the PSA—the trust 
document—says that the transfer must be done in a certain way and the transfer did not comply, 
the transfer is void, irrespective of whether it would comply with the Uniform Commercial Code 
or other law.  The trust document creates a higher level of conduct to which the transfer must 
comply.   
PSAs require a specific form of transfer.  First, the PSA contains a recital of the 
transfer.96  But per New York trust law, that recital alone is insufficient to effectuate a transfer to 
a common law trust.97  Second, PSAs contain a provision that calls for delivery to the trustee for 
every mortgage loan in the deal of  
the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening endorsements showing a 
complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee, endorsed 
“Pay to the order of _____________, without recourse” and signed (which may 
be by facsimile signature) in the name of the last endorsee by an authorized 
officer.98 
The reason for requiring this complete chain of endorsement from originator up through 
the Depositor before a final endorsement to the trust is to provide a clear evidentiary basis for all 
of the transfers in the chain of title in order to remove any doubts about the bankruptcy 
remoteness of the assets transferred to the trust.  Absent a complete chain of endorsements, it 
                                                
92 A few provisions of the UCC are mandatory, but these do not affect the chain of title issue.   
93 UCC 1-203; 1-201(b)(3) (defining “agreement”).   
94 14-140 Warren's Weed New York Real Property § 140.58 (“It is a fundamental principle of trust law that the instrument under 
which the trustee acts is the charter of his rights. Therefore, in administering the trust, he must act in accordance with its terms.  This rule applies 
to every kind of trustee, regardless of whether the trustee is to hold, invest or pay over income, or to sell or liquidate for the benefit of creditors.”). 
95 N.Y. E.P.T. L. § 7.2-4.   
96Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Securities Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3, § 2.01(b), July 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.z1Fa.d.htm (“The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, 
assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of 
the   Depositor in and to the [mortgage notes].”) 
97 Vincent v. Putnam, 248 N.Y. 76, 84 (N.Y. 1928) (“Mere words never constitute a delivery.”).  
98 Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Securities Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3, § 2.01(b), July 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.z1Fa.d.htm.  Deal language may vary, and some PSAs merely require endorsement in blank, not the chain of 
endorsements on the note.  See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Asset Backed Finance Corp. 2006-OPT- 1 Trust, July 1, 2006, available 
at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.v2K1.c.htm#8mq6 (requiring delivery to the trustee of “the original Mortgage Note, endorsed in blank or with 
respect to any lost Mortgage Note, an original Lost Note Affidavit, together with a copy of the related Mortgage Note” but not of intervening 
endorsements.). 
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could be argued that the trust assets were transferred directly from the originator to the trust, 
raising the concern that if the originator filed for bankruptcy, the trust assets could be pulled 
back into the originator’s bankruptcy estate.   
 
D.  COMPLIANCE 
Regardless of the legal method that applies for transferring notes and mortgages, there is 
a question of whether there was compliance with that method in actual securitization deals.  The 
American Securitization Forum white paper says nothing on this count, nor can it; evaluating 
compliance would involve examining actual loan files.  This is something that federal bank 
regulators should be doing, and I would urge the Committee to underscore that point in 
conversations with the regulators.   
There are, of course, a multitude of potential non-compliance problems, including the 
premature shredding of notes99 or the signing of assignments by purported agents of now-defunct 
companies.  The scope of these problems is unclear; they may plague individual deals or just 
individual loans within those deals.  On the other hand, if the PSAs set forth the transfer 
requirements, there may well be widespread non-compliance with the endorsement requirements 
of the PSAs.  Most notes contain only a single endorsement in blank, not “all intervening 
endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee” 
before a final endorsement in blank.  This would appear to mean that such transfers are void 
under New York law and that the mortgages were never actually transferred to the trusts issuing 
the MBS and this could not be corrected because of various timeliness requirements in PSAs.  
It bears emphasis that the validity of transfers to the trusts is an unsettled legal issue.  It is 
not as clear as either the American Securitization Forum or any law firm with outstanding 
securitization opinion letter liability would have one believe.  There are questions both about 
what law actually governs the transfers and about whether there was compliance with the law.  If 
there is a widespread chain of title problem, however, it would create a systemic crisis, as title on 
most properties in the US would be clouded and the contract rescission/putback liability because 
of the failed transfers would greatly surpass the market capitalization of the country’s major 
banks.  
 
IV.  YES, BUT WHO CARES?  THESE ARE ALL DEADBEATS 
 
A.  DOES BANKS’ CONVENIENCE TRUMP RULE OF LAW?  
A common response from banks about the problems in the securitization and foreclosure 
process is that it doesn’t matter as the borrower still owes on the loan and has defaulted.  This 
“No Harm, No Foul” argument is that homeowners being foreclosed on are all a bunch of 
deadbeats, so who really cares about due process? As JPMorganChase’s CEO Jamie Dimon put 
it “for the most part by the time you get to the end of the process we're not evicting people who 
                                                
99 See Florida Bankers’ Ass’n Comment to the Florida Supreme Court on the Emergency Rule and Form Proposals of the Supreme 
Court Task Force on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, at 4, at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38213950/Notes-Are-Destroyed (“The reason 
‘many firms file lost note counts as a standard alternative pleading in the complaint’ is because the physical document was deliberately 
eliminated to avoid confusion immediately upon its conversion to an electronic file.”).  
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deserve to stay in their house.”100 
Mr. Dimon’s logic condones vigilante foreclosures:  so long as the debtor is delinquent, it 
does not matter who evicts him or how.  (And it doesn’t matter if there are some innocents who 
lose their homes in wrongful foreclosures as long as “for the most part” the borrowers are in 
default.)  But that is not how the legal system works.  A homeowner who defaults on a mortgage 
doesn’t have a right to stay in the home if the proper mortgagee forecloses, but any old stranger 
cannot take the law into his own hands and kick a family out of its home.  That right is reserved 
solely for the proven mortgagee.   
Irrespective of whether a debt is owed, there are rules about who can collect that debt and 
how.  The rules of real estate transfers and foreclosures have some of the oldest pedigrees of any 
laws.  They are the product of centuries of common law wisdom, balancing equities between 
borrowers and lenders, ensuring procedural fairness and protecting against fraud.   
The most basic rule of real estate law is that only the mortgagee may foreclosure. 
Evidence and process in foreclosures are not mere technicalities nor are they just symbols of rule 
of law.  They are a paid-for part of the bargain between banks and homeowners. Mortgages in 
states with judicial foreclosures cost more than mortgages in states without judicial oversight of 
the foreclosure process.101  This means that homeowners in judicial foreclosure states are buying 
procedural protection along with their homes, and the banks are being compensated for it with 
higher interest rates.  Banks and homeowners bargained for legal process, and rule of law, which 
is the bedrock upon which markets are built function, demands that the deal be honored.   
Ultimately the “No Harm, No Foul,” argument is a claim that rule of law should yield to 
banks’ convenience.  To argue that problems in the foreclosure process are irrelevant because the 
homeowner owes someone a debt is to declare that the banks are above the law.   
 
B.  ARE THEY ALL DEADBEATS?  
 Not every homeowner in foreclosure is a deadbeat.  There are some homeowners who are 
in foreclosure while current on their mortgages, others who are in foreclosure after having been 
told by their servicers that they have received loan modifications, and others who are in 
foreclosure because of warehouse lending fraud problems whereby their original lender sold their 
same mortgage multiple times.  There are also homeowners who are in foreclosure because of 
predatory servicing practices such as charges for forced-placed insurance at way-above-market 
rates and misapplication of payments (such as illegally applying payments first to late fees and 
then the principal and interest owed so as to make the payment only qualify as a partial payment, 
thus incurring another late fee).  These homeowners are hardly deadbeats; they are in foreclosure 
not because of their own behavior, but because of their servicer’s behavior.   
 Ultimately, we don’t know how many homeowners in foreclosure are truly in default on 
their mortgages.  To actually determine that would require a detailed examination of 
homeowners’ payment history, an examination that would take several hours in most cases, and 
homeowners currently lack the right to receive servicing statements showing how their payments 
                                                
100 Tamara Keith & Renee Montaigne, Sorting Out the Banks’ Foreclosure Mess, NPR, Oct. 15, 2010.  
101 See Karen Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity:  State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177 (2006) (noting that 
the availability—and hence the cost—of mortgages in states with judicial foreclosure proceedings is greater than in states with non-judicial 
foreclosures). 
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are applied.  A servicer’s assertion that the homeowner is delinquent is not conclusive evidence, 
especially if the assertion is in a robosigned affidavit.  Most homeowners in foreclosure are 
likely in default, but given that most homeowners lack legal representation, we should be 
cautious in assuming too much.  Sometimes a default judgment is an admission that the plaintiff 
is correct, and sometimes it is just a sign of lack of resources to litigate.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The foreclosure process is beset with problems ranging from procedural defects that can 
be readily cured to outright fraud to the potential failure of the entire private label mortgage 
securitization system.   
 In the best case scenario, the problems in the mortgage market are procedural defects and 
they will be remedied within reasonably quickly (perhaps taking around a year).  Remedying 
them will extend the time that properties are in foreclosure and increase the shadow housing 
inventory, thereby driving down home prices.  The costs of remedying these procedural defects 
will also likely be passed along to future mortgage borrowers, thereby frustrating attempts to 
revive the housing market and the economy through easy monetary policy.   
 In the worst case scenario, there is systemic risk, as there could be a complete failure of 
loan transfers in private-label securitization deals in recent years, resulting in trillions of dollars 
of rescission claims against major financial institutions.  This would trigger a wholesale financial 
crisis.   
 Perhaps the most important lesson from 2008 is the need to be ahead of the ball of 
systemic risk.  This means (1) ensuring that federal regulators do a serious investigation as 
discussed in this testimony above and (2) considering the possible legislative response to a crisis.  
The sensible course of action here is to avoid gambling on unsettled legal issues that could have 
systemic consequences.  Instead, we should recognize that stabilizing the housing market is the 
key toward economic recovery, and that it is impossible to fix the housing market unless the 
number of foreclosures is drastically reduced, thereby reducing the excess inventory that drives 
down housing prices and begets more foreclosures.  Unless we fix the housing market, consumer 
spending will remain depressed, and as long as consumer spending remains depressed, high 
unemployment will remain and the US economy will continue in a doldrums that it can ill-afford 
given the impending demographics of retirement.   
This suggests that the best course of action is a global settlement on mortgage issues, the 
key elements of which must be (1) a triage between homeowners who can and cannot pay with 
principal reduction and meaningful modifications for homeowners with an ability to pay and 
speedier foreclosures for those who cannot, (2) a quieting of title on securitized properties, and 
(3) a restructuring of bank balance sheets in accordance with loss recognition.   
A critical point in any global settlement, however, must be removing mortgage servicers 
from the loan modification process.  Servicers were historically never in the loan modification 
business on any scale, and four years of hoping that something would change have demonstrated 
that servicers never will manage to successfully modify many loans on their own.  They lack the 
capacity, they lack the incentives, and the lack the will.   
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If we want to see more loan modifications—and I would submit that this is important not 
just as a type disaster relief for deserving homeowners, but as an indispensable measure for 
stabilizing the housing market and the economy—then we need to take servicers out of the loan 
modification process and have modifications done either by a government agency or by the 
courts or by outcome-neutral third parties.   
A global settlement would also be an allocation of the losses from the implosion of the 
housing bubble.  Those losses are not avoidable.  The Treasury Department’s unspoken hope that 
the economy will grow its way out of those losses and that they can be recognized against future 
retained earnings was optimistic to begin with and given the performance of the economy of the 
past two years, it is Pollyannaism to continue in such a belief.  Instead, if the economy is to move 
forward without losing a decade or more in a long-shot bet on sudden resurrection, we must face 
the losses from the financial crisis and allocate them sensibly.  There are only a limited number 
of places where we can put those losses:  homeowners, banks, MBS investors (including many 
pension funds), or the government.  There are political choices to be made in any allocation, but 
failure to make an explicit allocation is also a choice—that the losses will be borne by 
homeowners and MBS investors.  We should be cognizant of these choices.   
I recognize that for many, the preferred course of action is not to deal with a problem 
until it materializes and certainly to avoid any loss allocation that might threaten US financial 
institutions.  But if we pursue that route, we may well be confronted with an unmanageable 
crisis.  We cannot rebuild the US housing finance system until we deal with the legacy problems 
from our old system, and these are problems that are best addressed sooner, before an acute 
crisis, then when it is too late.   
